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ABSTRACT
The liberal worldview is founded on two interlinked promises: the inherent capacity of markets to deliver
prosperity and development globally; and the increased prospects for peace in contexts of inter-state
integration along liberal institutional and market lines. This paper takes issue with the latter, now often
prescribed as a remedy against the geopolitical instability brought about by unpredictable ‘populist’ leaders.
While decades of neoliberal integration have brought nation-states closer together and engendered degrees
and forms of inter-state equality within world market capitalism, populations across the world have fallen
prey to the violence of markets and growing intra-state inequalities. In such a context, the contemporary rise
of nationalism and populisms across the world is not some liberal order antithesis emerging from a vacuum,
but rather a logical consequence of this liberal order, constituting an often reactionary ‘counter movement’
that cannot be tackled with prescriptions for increased market globalization. A focus on the everyday forms
of violence fomented beyond the inter-state level by processes of marketization demonstrates that
neoliberalism’s rescaling of violence and risk from the international stage down to the individual has resulted
in the contemporary rise of illiberal politics and, indeed, new prospects for global peace.
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INTRODUCTION
The idea of a self-adjusting market implied a stark utopia. Such an institution could not exist for any length
of time without annihilating the human and natural substance of society; it would have physically destroyed
man and transformed his surroundings into a wilderness. (Polanyi, 2001, p. 3)
The contemporary rise of illiberal politics, nationalism and partially mercantilist worldviews –
with the governments of the United States, Russia and China, among others, reinvigorating
national discourses and agendas, and unilaterally initiating military action or entertaining expan-
sionist agendas; and with the rise of the far-right looming over Europe – has left liberal elites in
apparent distress. As they contemplate the extensive rejection of many of the values that have
© 2018 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives License (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original
work is properly cited, and is not altered, transformed, or built upon in any way.
CONTACT
r.gonzalez.vicente@hum.leidenuniv.nl; rgvcam@gmail.com
Leiden Institute for Area Studies, Leiden University, Leiden, the Netherlands.
TERRITORY, POLITICS, GOVERNANCE
https://doi.org/10.1080/21622671.2018.1550012
underwritten the global liberal project since the 1980s and 1990s, these elites fear not only a
potential retreat of the policies that facilitated globalized accumulation in the last decades but
also the breakdown of the Liberal Peace, or the idea that economic interdependence between
nation-states is paramount in containing international violence. This has been followed by a pro-
liferation of cautionary tales against a ‘populist rise’, as institutions such as the International Mon-
etary Fund (IMF) cling to market integration as the foremost recipe for prosperity and peace
(Mayeda, 2016). Indeed, the clarion calls have resonated well beyond the liberal Atlantic heart-
land, as exempliﬁed by the visit paid by Chinese President Xi Jinping to the World Economic
Forum (WEF) in January 2017. There, the Secretary General of the Chinese Communist
Party attacked protectionism, promoted trade and investment liberalization, and cautioned that
‘no one will emerge as a winner in a trade war’, in a sui generis contribution to a long-standing
narrative that couples anti-market resistance with international conﬂict (Xi, 2017).
Yet, the contemporary ascension of nationalist and populist movements and leaders that herald
deeply illiberal views (Xi included) must come as no surprise after decades of neoliberal triumphalism
and the promotion of a transnational order that placed the crafting of a world market above the
needs of societies themselves. In such a context, the contemporary rise of nationalism and populisms
across the world is not some liberal order antithesis emerging from a vacuum, but rather a logical
consequence of this liberal order, constituting an often reactionary ‘counter movement’ that cannot
be tackled with liberal prescriptions for increased market globalization (Polanyi, 2001). This paper
takes aim at the now long-held and recently revitalized argument for a liberal peace. While not
attempting to predict any speciﬁc outcome regarding the future of global peace, it argues that the
rise of illiberal and reactionary discourses that we now observe, and their potential corollaries,
must be understood in a dialectical sense as the result of a liberal market-oriented inter-state
order that failed to tackle the great social dislocation that it played a fundamental role in fomenting.
To develop this critique, I draw upon three main bodies of literature that, despite their appar-
ent afﬁnities, are seldom brought together. These include Polanyi and Gramsci-inspired under-
standings of hegemonic crisis, counter-movements, and the rise of nationalism and populism
(Gill, 2015; Gonzalez-Vicente & Carroll, 2017); critical political economies of social conﬂict
within a context of neoliberal globalization (Harvey, 2005; Springer, 2015); and political geogra-
phy analyses of international relations theory (IRT), and more speciﬁcally critical geographies of
peace (Agnew & Corbridge, 1995; Flint, 2005; Koopman, 2016; McConnell, Megoran, & Wil-
liams, 2014; Megoran, 2011; Nagle, 2010; Williams & McConnell, 2011). Elaborating upon
these, I contend that the methodological nationalism of the disciplines of economics and inter-
national relations – in which much of the liberal view is based – has left them in a sorry state
in making sense of recent political development throughout the world, speciﬁcally when addres-
sing the contemporary rise of reactionary forms of populism.
In this sense, the high degrees of violence and vulnerability associated with processes of market
integration have often escaped the radars of economics and IR analyses, ﬁxated as they are with
mono-scale scrutiny of national economies and state-to-state relations. Although some liberal
IR scholars have laid the grounds for a less normative paradigm that incorporates domestic vari-
ables and bottom-up societal processes into the understanding of state action, the assumption
remains that policy interdependence and compatibility between states, combined with the Par-
eto-efﬁcient outcomes of globally integrated production and trade, result in ‘strong incentives
for coexistence with low conﬂict’ (Moravcsik, 1997, p. 521; see also Oneal & Russett, 1997;
McDonald & Sweeney, 2007). Recent developments suggest there are fundamental ﬂaws with
this largely deductive hypothesis. Whereas on aggregate terms, and according to some measure-
ments, nation-states may have beneﬁtted more or less from globalization, social conﬂict occurring
at multiple scales – and indeed in a class-based dimension – is an undeniable constitutive element
of state action, the latter reﬂecting and/or attempting to contain particular constellations of social
forces and their interests. In this way, the damage inﬂicted upon many by increasingly
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disembedded markets and post-political states that shield policy from popular deliberation (both
the products of the liberal agenda) are at the very root of the current crisis of liberal hegemony
(Gonzalez-Vicente & Carroll, 2017).
In what follows, I draw upon a variety of cases to explain how a dialectical approach to liberal-
ism, neoliberalism and their illiberal responses,1 and a multi-scalar analysis of market violence are
indispensable in explaining much of the turbulence that world politics faces today. To be clear, the
paper’s goal is not to deny that state leaders factor in the economic repercussions of conﬂict when
they contemplate its possibility – a logical assumption of liberal international relations scholarship.
The aim is instead to argue that these calculations tell very little about the nature of peace and
conﬂict as historically bounded processes that need to be studied in relation to broader transform-
ations in the global political economy, the latter affecting state behaviour in terms of both econ-
omic policy and inter-state rivalry. In this way, and crucially, I also wish to refute the liberal
argument that the pursuit of economic integration at any (social) cost will unequivocally lower
the prospects for international conﬂict or, indeed, structural violence more broadly understood
as a multi-scalar phenomenon.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section problematizes the concept of peace in IRT,
with a more detailed discussion of economic liberalism. The following section presents a temporal
critique, contextualizing the contemporary rise of illiberal politics within the transformation of the
global political economy under world market capitalism. After this, I build upon Agnew (1994) to
develop a scalar critique and argue that liberalism’s methodological nationalism hampers a proper
assessment of the transnational dimensions of processes such as development, violence or peace. I
chart various scales of market-induced violence and vulnerability (as a form of economic violence)
in the global era, tracing the rescaling of violence and risk from the interstate scale to the individual
sphere. I conclude by discussing the transition from a ‘durable disorder’ (Cerny, 1998) to an emer-
ging (albeit contested) new populist order under world market capitalism. To do so, I echo Polanyi
and Marx in contending that processes of marketization, replete as they are with contradiction,
cannot engender liberal or capitalist peace, but result instead in anti-liberal reactions of various
kinds (what Polanyi called ‘counter movements’) to the violence of unrestrained markets. Impor-
tantly, these counter movements can often take reactionary characteristics, as people under threat
or the perception of threat retreat into culture and nationalism against the ‘other’ and internation-
alism in all its variants.
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND THE LIBERAL PEACE
While the pursuit of peace is a central preoccupation for progressive IR scholarship, peace as a
concept and as an actual manifestation is rarely discussed in the IR literature. Instead, peace
often appears as a negative occurrence, intuitively understood as the avoidance of war or an absence
of overt inter-state violence (Galtung, 1969; Richmond, 2016, p. 57). Thereby, most IR literature
focuses on the challenges to state-based peace, with commentary typically dominated by the two
main competing schools, realism and liberalism, both subdivided into further dissenting sub-
camps. Conventional realist approaches take the ‘anarchic’ or violent nature of international poli-
tics as a given and place their focus on states’ survival strategies. Offensive realists warn of the
disruptive effects of ‘power transitions’ and in the contemporary context claim, for example,
that as China grows economically and militarily, and as its interests expand and it seeks greater
inﬂuence, tensions with other countries are certain to arise (Mearsheimer, 2014). Defensive neore-
alists hold similar assumptions about the foundations of the international system, yet contend that
states privilege security over domination and that the incentives for conﬂict are contingent rather
than endemic, with balances of power potentially keeping states at bay and preventing conﬂict
(Waltz, 1979).
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Liberal theorists dispute these interpretations and reject that competition alone guides state
behaviour. Elaborating on the Kantian ideal of ‘perpetual peace’, and drawing upon Adam
Smith, David Ricardo or John Stuart Mill, liberal theories contend that economic integration
and institutional enmeshment or socialization exercise a constraining force on conﬂict and are
conductive to peaceful scenarios (Doyle, 1986; Howard, 1981; Johnston, 2008; Keohane &
Nye, 1977). While there is no absolute agreement on the exact shape that such ‘interdependence’
should take (Mansﬁeld & Pollins, 2001), liberal IR scholars often hold that large-scale conﬂict in
the 21st century can be avoided if the liberal world order survives the relative decline of the United
States and manages to assimilate rising powers such as China. The emphasis is placed both on
institutions and norms of reciprocity, on the one hand, and on economic integration, on the
other. Regarding the latter, and evoking Smithian language, the agenda for a ‘capitalist peace’
assumes that free markets represent ‘“a hidden hand” that … build(s) up irrevocable and peaceful
connections between states’ (Gartzke, 2007; Richmond, 2008, p. 23), and that ‘put simply, glo-
balisation promotes peace’ (Gartzke & Li, 2003, p. 562). The theory is in many ways deductive,
but relies also on the statistical data that on aggregate tends partially to support the liberal peace
argument (except for the period leading to the First World War; see also Barbieri, 1996) and on
the ‘logic’ that national leaders are not expected to act irrationally or be insensitive ‘to economic
loss and the preferences of powerful domestic actors’ (Hegre, Oneal, & Russett, 2010, p. 772).
A more nuanced exposition of the liberal argument suggests that what brings nations together
and heightens the opportunity cost of conﬂict is market integration according to a set of com-
monly devised regulations – rather than the realization of an ideal ‘free’ trade archetype (Moravc-
sik, 2005). This results in a sort of ‘embedded liberalism’, with the successful integration of post-
Soviet states and China in world market capitalism through World Trade Organization (WTO)
membership and other liberalizing initiatives understood as a deterrent to military action and,
hence, as an effective strategy for both global growth and security, particularly in the face of Chi-
na’s rising economic and military might (Funabashi, Oksenberg, & Weiss, 1994). From this per-
spective, not only is violence avoidable but also peace may indeed be engineered with the creation
of a world market society being key to this endeavour as well as to the broader goal of crafting a
liberal hegemony able to deliver a veritable ‘end of history’ where markets and functioning liberal
democracies prevail (Fukuyama, 1992). The engineering of market-orientated democracies has
indeed often been the main task of liberal peace- and state-building operatives in post-conﬂict
areas (Campbell, Chandler, & Sabaratnam, 2011).
Yet, decades of neoliberal integration have not brought Fukuyama’s prophecy closer to its
realization. Across the world, liberal market integration has facilitated convivial relations
among key countries and paid important dividends to elites, yet it has also resulted in the concen-
tration of wealth in ever fewer hands, rising inequalities within countries (although not between
them) and higher concentration of wealth at the top, and increased risks and vulnerability as the
logic of market competitiveness takes hold of many aspects of our lives (Anand & Segal, 2015;
Lynch, 2006). The relation between the United States and China or the processes of economic
integration in the European Union are clear examples of these trends. In these places as well as
others, inequalities, precarization and economic insecurity have given way to a populist and
nationalist momentum that can be interpreted both as a popular response to the extreme and
diverse forms of violence engendered by processes of market integration, or as a manoeuvre to
channel discontent towards the ‘other’ in order to protect elite interests (Gonzalez-Vicente & Car-
roll, 2017). By prescribing ever more market globalization to counter populist politics and avoid
conﬂict, liberal elites add fuel to the ﬁre as they sever the very conditions that led to the disfranch-
isement of signiﬁcant segments of the population in the ﬁrst place. Thereby, it is crucial to under-
stand how the argument for capitalist peace fails to factor in the crisis-prone and socially
destructive tendencies of capitalism, particularly in a context of unfenced global competitiveness
along market lines.2
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Two of the underlying problems in the liberal peace argument stand out. The ﬁrst has to do
with the statistical selection of ﬁxed points in time that suggest correlations between growth in
trade and diminished conﬂict – while failing to discern mechanisms of causation (Hayes,
2012). A wider temporal lens is needed to situate the contemporary rise of mercantilist and illib-
eral politics in the context of neoliberal globalization, representing the same sort of ‘counter move-
ment’ that Polanyi had warned of in his reading of the 19th-century downward spiral towards war
– aided in our contemporary case by the demise of the traditional left (Blyth & Matthijs, 2017;
Carroll & Gonzalez-Vicente, 2017). The second problem relates to liberal international political
economy and IRT’s scalar ﬁxation on inter-state matters and hence their inability to factor in vio-
lence in the absence of war. I turn now to these two points.
NEOLIBERALISM’S ILLIBERAL MOMENT AS COUNTER MOVEMENT
On paper, the two intertwined arguments for liberal peace would seem to make sense: if countries
remove the barriers to trade and investment and choose to specialize in their comparative advan-
tages, international productivity will be raised and we will enjoy a more prosperous global economy
with satisﬁed consumers and states; also, if states develop close economic linkages, they will have
important material incentives to avoid conﬂict with one another. In the real world, competition
between jurisdictions and social groups implies often that the development and prosperity of
some is based on the exploitation and vulnerability of others, as typically emphasized by the exten-
sive literature on bifurcated economies, temporally constrained and contradictory growth patterns,
and uneven and destructive forms of development. In this way, it is not that economic interdepen-
dence, when removed from its social context and put under the microscope, does not raise the
costs of conﬂict. However, the political choices and social transformations needed to achieve inter-
dependence are a key variable to understanding a state’s behaviour and predisposition to conﬂict.
And while governments may in many junctures align with the interests of capital, they are not
immune to crises of legitimacy, and will need to mediate issues of accumulation and social cohe-
sion when people perceive the social transformations required to achieve interdependence to have a
negative impact on their lives (Jessop, 2016, p. 189). This will reﬂect in a way or another on state
behaviour as political elites, current and prospective, jostle for votes and/or legitimacy.
A key problem with the argument for liberal peace lies in its emphasis on narrow temporal cor-
relations between trade and (lack of) conﬂict, which removes interdependence from its broader
political economic context, disembedding peace and conﬂict from the broader set of historically
bounded and politically contingent social relations that underpin them. A widened analytical
timeframe renders clear the dialectical relationship between (neo)liberal social projects and their
social responses, both progressive and reactionary. Whereas high volumes of trade may coincide
at a particular ‘optimal’ period of liberal expansionism with interstate peace, they may also trans-
form societies in ways that engender the conditions for a potential ‘illiberal’ turn or counter
movement resulting in a higher risk of conﬂict as beggar-thy-neighbour positions emerge and
new enemies need to be sought by political elites to bind national-constrained constituencies to
their agendas to maintain power.
We can observe this temporal incongruity in the work of some of the key proponents of the
capitalist peace. For example, Oneal and Russett (1999, p. 439) argue that trade ‘sharply reduces
the onset of or involvement in militarized disputes among contiguous and major-power pairs’,
which are identiﬁed by Maoz and Russett (1993) as the set of countries more likely to enter
into conﬂict with each other. Despite Oneal and Russett’s sophisticated approach to the data
(modelling, for example, to avoid ‘false negatives’ by factoring in geographic contiguity, or control-
ling for alliances) and the attention paid to statistical rejections of the liberal peace argument, trade
interdependence and the occurrence of conﬂict are analyzed on a year-by-year basis (Oneal & Rus-
sett, 1999, p. 428). This is also the case with other comparable studies (Hegre, 2000; Oneal &
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Russett, 2001; Souva & Prins, 2006). This temporal frame is problematic, as inter-national con-
ﬂict tends to build up over prolonged periods of time, and the adverse impacts of interdependence
and liberal integration are more likely to result ﬁrst in crisis and social dislocation, followed by
some sort of economic distancing (perhaps under a new administration that replaces the one
that embraced liberalization) and a wide range of policy measures, before leading to military con-
ﬂict – underpinned either by the state that perceives that liberal integration is having negative
impacts on socioeconomic development, or more often than not by the one which wants to prevent
the deterioration of important trade and investment links.
Here, one vital issue often left out of the liberal peace equations is the fact that most military
interventions in the post-Second World War period were aimed at disciplining countries that
opted out of the United States’ global liberalizing project and sought to pursue a variety of indi-
genous pathways to modernity, often including many that did so under the rubric of socialism,
democratically achieved or otherwise. The reverse is also true, as countries that chose to ally
with the United States during the Cold War were shielded from attacks, and in some cases
given preferential trade access, technology transfer and allowed to engage in market protection.
In this context, associating conﬂict with the lack of strong trade links, rather than to the meticu-
lous unfolding of a market-based imperial agenda, would be tantamount to concluding that low
opium consumption was responsible for British military expeditions in 19th-century China.
While there is certainly a correlation between China’s ban on opium and British intervention,
nobody could seriously suggest that opium consumption reduces interstate conﬂict. Similarly,
in many of these cases, it is not that the absence of trade results in conﬂict, but on the contrary,
that military intervention has often been aimed at expanding markets and protecting investment.
This situation is aptly explained by Richmond (2006), who discusses ‘virtual’ peace and
emphasizes how war and peace can be synonymous in countries subjected to military intervention
in the name of liberal peace. Old examples of this practice would include the above-mentioned
Opium Wars or indeed most colonial wars to open new market frontiers. Cold War examples
abound, from the CIA-supported assassination of Salvador Allende following his policies of
nationalization and collectivization in Chile, to the training of Contras to oust the Sandinista
National Liberation Front in Nicaragua, or the perennial yoke on Cuba to seed the ground for
a market-friendly regime.3 While these interventions were justiﬁed on the basis of dubious argu-
ments regarding the national security of the attacking country, today these rationales cohabit with
moral claims for ‘human security’ and humanitarian intervention in the target countries, although
many authors have suggested that these moral arguments often conceal Realpolitik motivations
(Chandler, 2004). The Iraq War is a case in point, having achieved a boom in trading links
between Iraq and United States following the 2003 invasion, with a six-fold increase of trade
between 2002 and 2008 that only started to decline following the discovery of shale oil reserves
in the United States (United States Census Bureau, 2017), but having achieved very little in
terms of curbing internal violence.
The liberal peace ﬁxation with short-term correlations between trade openness and the absence
of grand inter-national conﬂict is particularly perplexing if one considers how the liberal argument
for economic development dismisses the immediate social dislocations underpinned by market
integration as tangential to longer term improvements for all segments of society (Garret, 1998,
p. 796). Here, it would seem that liberal arguments for peace and development operate under
different temporal logics. If liberalism’s positive impacts on peace are attested with a focus on yearly
correlations between commerce and an absence of conﬂict, its alleged positive developmental
impacts can often be supported only by eschewing the immediate social conﬂict and diminished
living standards fomented by interdependence andmarketization – see, for example, the arguments
for structural adjustment throughout the developing world in the 1980s and 1990s or more recent
austerity policies in Europe, which, incidentally, many authors have demonstrated to be also coun-
terproductive for long-term development (Blyth, 2013; Chang, 2007).
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This last example brings one back to the contemporary juncture. Across the world, we are
observing an emergence of illiberal politics in countries that have represented the backbone of neo-
liberal globalization, and indeed at its very Anglo-American core. In many places, reactionary
politicians have been ﬁrst to galvanize social discontent successfully by publicly condemning
the negative social impacts of economic globalization, such as increased inequalities and growing
insecurity. In the United States, the UK or France, for example, it has been the populist right that
has more prominently hoisted the anti-globalization ﬂag, even if its discourses place targets on
ethnic minorities or national trade imbalances, rather than on class inequality or the increased
leverage of businesses in processes of transnational integration. We can see, for example, how ris-
ing job insecurity and deteriorating living standards in the UK were mobilized by the Brexit cam-
paign. While much of the ‘Leave’ discourse was problematic, and focused its anger towards
European Union regulations and immigrants, Brexit advocates successfully tapped into a wide-
spread sense of vulnerability and precarization throughout the isles that is intimately linked to neo-
liberal transformations at home and to the consolidation of the world market and its competitive
pressures more broadly (Pettifor, 2017; The Guardian, 2016). Similarly, Donald Trump’s anti-
China and anti-migrant rhetoric resonated with the experiences of many in the middle class
who have been on the losing side of growing inequality and declining social mobility for decades,
but also remarkably in the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis, with the top 1% capturing
85.1% of the country’s income growth between 2009 and 2013 (Economic Policy Institute,
2016). Indeed, there are striking similarities in the protestations of politicians at opposite ends
of the spectrum, such as Trump and Bernie Sanders, despite proposing diametrically opposed
treatments to the perceived problems, with Trump doing little to upset the business-centric
order and only adding bigotry and defensive nationalism into the mix.4
In this way, this rise of illiberal positions andmovementsmust not be seen as a diversion from the
road to neoliberal globalization, but rather a direct consequence of the consolidation of the world
market facilitated by neoliberal policy sets and the techno-logistical developments underpinning
globalized forms of accumulation. The current illiberal rise is hence aptly interpreted both as a coun-
ter movement in the Polanyian sense, and as a dialectical relationship. Although the detrimental
social impacts of liberal integration are often felt rather swiftly by many, their reverberations into
politics take the shape ofmore prolonged reactions. Yet, there is a strong association between liberal
integration, its social impacts and the rearticulations of politics that follow and that we currently
experience in many parts of the world (Gonzalez-Vicente &Carroll, 2017). The current rise of var-
ious kinds of populism – in places as diverse as theUnited States, theUK, Indonesia, Russia, Turkey
or thePhilippines, to name a few – represents from this perspective a ‘countermovement’ following a
‘global organic crisis’ (Gill, 2015), as people look beyond themainstream for alternatives that explain
and respond to the social dislocations brought about by the pursuit of transnational liberal inte-
gration. In this way, neoliberalism’s illiberal moment is in a dialectical relationship with the pursuit
of a liberal utopia, mirroring the Polanyian counter movement that would put an end to the
‘Hundred Years Peace’ (1815–1914). Most importantly, the traditional centre left’s failure in
many contexts to formulate viable responses to the current social dislocation has left it up to the reac-
tionary right to devise a way out of the crisis.5 More often than not, the leaders of the new populist
moment combine an enduring business- andmarket-centric approach to development with nation-
alist and reactionary discourse, resulting in a dangerous blend that is likely to perpetuate social
discontent, but redirecting it not towards the policy and economic elites responsible of the current
developmental impasse but towards countries that are increasingly perceived as rivals.
THE MULTIPLE SCALES OF VIOLENT NEOLIBERALISM
How are we then to explain the inability of mainstream liberal approaches to predict what seems to
be a logical turn – in the form of a societal defence or Polanyian ‘counter movement’ versus the
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inequalities, risks and vulnerabilities fomented by the world market? Much of the problem lies
within IRT’s scalar limitations, which we can explore by focusing on the disjunction between
the interstate scale and the diversity of political economic processes and social conﬂict occurring
at other scales. This disjunction is with no doubt closely related to IRT’s development and con-
solidation in the post-Second World War years, a period characterized by particular patterns of
growth of national development, marked ideological preferences and methodological nationalism
– although at that point debates on structural violence and positive peace already existed in the
margins of the ﬁeld of IR (Gleditsch, Nordkvelle, & Strand, 2014). These all resulted in what
John Agnew famously described as IRT’s ‘territorial trap’, a ﬁxation with the interstate scale
and the assumption that states are containers of societies, with politics played in a domestic/
foreign binary (Agnew, 1994). Below, I expand on this notion to discuss how violence or risk
have been rescaled in the neoliberal era from the interstate realm and into the individual one,
with societies taking on the costs of a competitive market integration that has allowed for – at
least temporarily – relatively convivial relations between key states (and the elites who control
them) mediating the global economic architecture (on risk, see also Beck, 1999).
IRT’s territorial trap remains ubiquitous. Despite decades of powerful critiques that have pre-
sented the post-Westphalian nation-state as a never fully realized political moment and a site of
social conﬂict (Agnew, 1994; Mitchell, 1991), states remain an ontological ﬁxation at the core of
IRT. This is even more so the case when it comes to the understanding of conﬂict and peace.
Whereas the ﬁeld of IR is today increasingly open to accepting ‘non-traditional’ security threats
such as organized crime, terrorism or epidemics, these are to a great degree studied as anomalies
in a state-based system, and considered only inasmuch as they pose a threat to state order. Typol-
ogies of war such as the Correlates of War (COW) Data Sets accept non-state entities as potential
actors of conﬂict. However, these are narrowly deﬁned as ‘nonterritorial entities or non-state armed
groups’ that are not formally accepted as members of the interstate system but which must contest
the power of a state or at least represent a violent challenge to state or state-like entities in order to be
agents of conﬂict (COW Wars v. 4.0, 2014). According to this understanding, peace is not only
negatively constructed as the absence of violence (Williams &McConnell, 2011, p. 928), but in par-
ticular as the absence of violence explicitly directed at the state or at gaining control of a state.
This monoscalar conceptualization of peace and conﬂict pervades liberal IRT, too, which con-
siders the state the key actor in international relations, and markets the connecting fabric holding
international peace together. Gartzke and Li argue, for example, how the demonstrators who took
the streets ‘from Seattle to Switzerland and from Gothenburg to Jakarta … mobilised by apoc-
alyptic visions of the menace of globalisation’ failed to recognize that economic integration offers
mutual beneﬁts to states that opt for settlements in the place of ﬁghting (Gartzke & Li, 2003,
p. 562). This is, of course, a caricature of ‘alter-globalisation’movements that fails to acknowledge
the transnational networks behind such movements.6 Yet, it is a useful example to show how, by
focusing on states as the aggregate beneﬁciaries of ‘efﬁcient’ modes of transnational production
and exchange, liberal scholarship eschews the variegated forms of politico-economic conﬂict
that market reordering foments at intrastate scales.
The crucial point is that, with the complexities of global dynamics ﬂattened into a chessboard
of one-dimensional state actors, mainstream IR perspectives are often unable to address the multi-
scalar violent repercussions of liberal market integration and therefore its challenges to positive
peace – understood as ‘the possibility of maximising human potential’ (Flint, 2005, p. 7) and
the absence of structural, cultural and environmental violence (Galtung, 1996; Richmond,
2008, p. 89). Peace, much like war, operates at ‘intertwined and mutually constitutive’ scales,
from the intimate to the global (Koopman, 2011, p. 194). Anchored in mid-20th-century statist
notions of world politics, conventional IR understandings of peace and conﬂict are oblivious to
threats to everyday peace when state power is not directly under challenge. In this way, foreign
direct investment or trade are considered phenomena that bring states more closely integrated,
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hence either increasing the likelihood of peace (from the liberal perspective) or not necessarily hav-
ing an impact on the probability of conﬂict in the long term (from the realist perspective).
Yet, the undemocratic trends behind processes of transnationalization of capital reproduce new
and old forms of violence. John Nagle, a political anthropologist of ethnic conﬂict, highlights, for
example, how global market integration may indeed ‘cause a violent backlash if economic recon-
struction dispossesses groups from their land or dismantles their traditional economic systems
without providing acceptable alternatives’ (Nagle, 2010, p. 232), or what could also be described
as processes of primitive accumulation without immediate proletarianization. The creation of
masses of unemployed youth, surplus to the immediate exploitative needs of capital, is of course
an important factor behind the rise of violence in many societies, as, for example, many in the Car-
ibbean (Pantin, 1996). Moreover, these processes of dispossession and the dismantling of liveli-
hoods are per se violent by-products of neoliberal integration.
Violent neoliberalism, mediated not by an invisible hand but by explicit elite interests (Harvey,
2005) or more subject-based processes of governmentality (Larner, 2000), is a recurrent phenom-
enon in the study of the globalization of capitalism. The integration of ‘developing countries’ with
global markets is typically plagued with violent rationales of development and tangible issues of
exploitation and dispossession, as vividly exempliﬁed in Simon Springer’s studies of violent neo-
liberalism in Cambodia (Springer, 2015). An important issue to be considered here is the trans-
formation of the state alongside processes of economic globalization, adopting increasingly
competitive and regulatory forms, and ubiquitously morphing into what some have described as
‘capitalist states’ (Jessop, 2002). This transformation implies that, through processes of disciplin-
ary neoliberalism (Gill, 1995), states can in fact mediate between global competitive forces and
domestic societies not to protect the latter from outside dangers or the recurring crises of capital-
ism, but in fact to impose measures of austerity, protect creditors, and in general promote more
precarious and vulnerable patterns of living.
A powerful example of violent neoliberalism is found in processes of worker exploitation
fomented by ﬂexible regimes of accumulation required to attract capital investment. This explains
why 70,000 workplace casualties in China during 2012 (The Economist, 2013) – a country where
workers’ independent organization is to a great extent illegal, or 180,000 protests in 2010 (The
Wall Street Journal, 2011), do not affect IR’s calculations of peace, despite the close link between
these incidents and exploitation dynamics associated with China’s integration into global markets
(Chan, 2001). It is only from this perspective that IR scholars in China can present their country’s
growing economic pre-eminence as a ‘peaceful rise’, arguing that ‘the Chinese have made [the
choice] to embrace economic globalization rather than detach themselves from it’ (Zheng,
2005). Ironically, given the ostensible incompatibility between liberal emphases upon freedom
and pluralism and state propaganda, Chinese ofﬁcial media also suggests that globalization and
peace provide ‘favourable conditions for building a harmonious society’, where ‘the political
environment is stable, the economy is prosperous, people live in peace and work in comfort
and social welfare improves’ (People’s Daily, 2007). The actual ‘harmonisation’ of society in
China has indeed entailed occasional improvements in welfare provision and some concessions
to labour – for example, in the form of a new Labour Contract Law in 2007 that required
ﬁrms to give written contracts to their workers. Yet, disciplinary measures hold sway, and the
very lawyers who sought to protect worker rights under the Labour Contract Law framework
are being incarcerated under the charges of ‘disturbing social order’, while income inequality
and labour unrest have continued to rise (Financial Times, 2016; Hui & Chan, 2011). And cru-
cially, intrastate violence can in turn be rescaled to the inter-national sphere. Therefore, analysts
often associate the rise in protests and repression in China with the Chinese Communist Party’s
orchestration of and permissiveness towards nationalist campaigns and patriotic discourse –
including typical recourse to international belligerence over disputed territories and anti-Western
rhetoric – in search for legitimacy (Hughes, 2006).
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Similarly, there has been an emergence of inequality, vulnerability and precarization in econ-
omically developed countries that can also be analyzed under the framework of violent neoliberal-
ism. As transnational capital beneﬁts from exploiting the world’s largest unfree labour force in
China and other low and middle income countries, middle classes elsewhere have seen their rights
and economic power decline. In the United States, the last decades of globalization and prosperity
have been accompanied by increased levels of poverty, a net decline of 2.7 million jobs between
2001 and 2011, and declining inﬂation-adjusted minimum wages (Mischel & Davis, 2015;
Scott, 2015; Shaefer & Edin, 2013). Marketization has reached grotesque proportions, and
today even the disciplinary apparatus of the state is up for sale, resulting in skyrocketing incarcera-
tion rates, chieﬂy affecting impoverished populations and the African American community (BBC,
2014). In Spain, a rampant series of evictions following the 2008 Global Financial Crisis – with
over 600,000 foreclosures from 2008 to 2015 (El País, 2015) – left families homeless while political
elites transferred €100 billion of public wealth to private and privatized ﬁnancial institutions, with
four-ﬁfths of the sum deemed unrecoverable according to the estimations of the Spanish Central
Bank. Global and national processes have in this way powerful impacts on other scales, including
the personal lived experiences of crisis. In the United States, studies ﬁnd that the 40% rise in
suicides since 1999 is connected to the recession of 2007–09, while theWorld Health Organisation
(WHO) observes a 60% increase in suicide rates across the world over the last 45 years that appears
to be connected to periodic spikes in economic hardship (Oyesanya, Lopez-Morinigo, & Dutta,
2015; Whiteman, 2015). With global afﬂuence concentrated in increasingly fewer hands (with
eight people having the same amount of wealth as 50% of the world’s population according to
some studies; Hardoon, 2017), and with risk gradually removed from markets and transferred to
increasingly vulnerable individuals, national illiberal politics has come to constitute a logical reac-
tion to the liberal order for many, or a quest for refuge from the violence of markets, however
fraught the responses offered by many of the populist alternatives now in vogue.
Another vivid example of violent neoliberalism is seen in the apparent capitulation of the
future of the world’s environment and the present livelihoods of many to the immediate needs
of capital. Here we see the expansion of capitalist activities in search of previously untapped
resources in the developing world and elsewhere driving conﬂict with local populations and
fomenting processes of internal colonialism and dispossession (Gonzalez-Vicente, 2017; Kaag
& Zoomers, 2014). Even a wide range of allegedly well-intentioned initiatives to preserve biodi-
versity operate now according to market logics, relying on the valuation and commodiﬁcation of
nature and the deployment of green credentials ultimately to displace populations in ways that are
reminiscent of processes of primitive accumulation (Fairhead, Leachm, & Scoones, 2012; Loh-
mann, 2010). And, of course, climate change and environmental degradation in general have
become key drivers of global migrations, with the risk of being displaced by natural disasters
today being 60% higher than 40 years ago and 25.4 million people needing to migrate every
year to escape the consequences of natural disasters (Greenpeace, 2017, p. 6). Crucial here –
once again – is the fact that our current global environmental crisis cannot be understood outside
the context of global liberal integration, as the promotion of ‘good business environments’ (note
the irony) and competition across jurisdictions to attract capital investments have resulted in any
attempt to make businesses pay for the environmental ‘externalities’ of production being just a
marginal note in a downward trajectory towards an environmental dystopia.
These violent by-products of liberal integration operate at scales that go from the global to the
intimate. Yet, despite the vast amounts of empirical evidence illustrating the violence inherent in
processes of marketization, the epistemological limitations of IRT create illusions of liberal peace
in the absence of conﬂict between states. The examples above illustrate how state-based peace is
limited in its implications for the everyday lives of many people and may even be counterproduc-
tive at diverse scales where violence is systematically applied and justiﬁed to perpetuate liberal state
peace and market integration. Importantly, people are not just victims of violence, but agents of
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political change. If at an early stage of globalization liberal elites were able to contain discontent
through appeals to technical prowess, claims of a lack of viable alternatives (see, for example, Mar-
garet Thatcher’s famous ‘there is no alternative’ mantra) and the depoliticization of policy more
broadly, today we observe a process of re-politicization that often takes reactionary forms (Gon-
zalez-Vicente & Carroll, 2017). While in some countries progressive alternatives to the liberal
order are revitalizing the political debate, and indeed solidarity campaigns have delivered some
important victories across the world, what we observe in many places today is the conjunction
of national reactionary discourse (with elites placing responsibilities for the social crisis on foreign
forces and migrants, for example) and a continued hegemony of markets. This new populist order
dangerously combines an economic base that will continue to produce market violence with
nationalist rationales that undermine internationalist solidarity, and which unfortunately invite
further violence towards the ‘other’.
FROM DURABLE DISORDER TO THE NEW POPULIST ORDER
Writing in 1998, Philip Cerny identiﬁed the emergence of a generalized sense of insecurity fol-
lowing the end of the Cold War, which he described as a ‘neomedieval scenario’ or a situation
of ‘durable disorder’, mirroring in a way what Eric Hobsbawm had earlier called a ‘descent to bar-
barism’ (Hobsbawm, 1994). Cerny explained that this durable disorder was characterized by:
nation-state based institutions and processes having been transformed into transmission belts and enforce-
ment mechanisms for decisions arrived at on different levels of the wider global system, but with that sys-
tem as a whole becoming increasingly incapable of generating effective, authoritative, multifunctional
coordination and control mechanisms or governance structures. (Cerny, 1998, p. 45)
Some of these elements are still discernible, and have been even ampliﬁed, in the current juncture.
With market efﬁciency having become a major ordering mechanism across jurisdictions, and with
global economic competition tightening proﬁt margins and deepening the productivity race, pol-
icy elites across the world struggle to promote economic competitiveness while maintaining social
legitimacy all at once. Yet, rather than rendering state institutions obsolete, dysfunctional or com-
pletely delegitimized, the contemporary crisis has resulted in attempts to renew or transform the
political discourse as a way of providing authoritative answers to the durable (social) disorder.
Indeed, some of these attempts have relied, in one way or another, on class rationales (e.g., Sanders
in the United States, Syriza in Greece), but many invoke the nation as an (imagined) community
under attack, not necessarily by markets and elites, but by an ‘other’ that is often found in compet-
ing economies or immigrants and their cultures. These political rearticulations replace the opti-
mistic globalizing rationales that liberal elites have prominently fomented since the 1980s, yet
in a curious and troubling way, the new populist order promoted by the likes of Trump in the Uni-
ted States or Xi in China combines the centrality of markets and the role of the capitalist state in
expanding them, with rising reactionary nationalism to assuage the social disorder brought about
by a consolidating the world market.
In order to trace the unfolding of neoliberalism’s contemporary illiberal moment, this paper
has discussed the intimate dialectical relationship between neoliberal violence at various scales
and the emergence of the new populist order, which has IR pundits pondering the increased like-
lihood of conﬂict. At one level, the durable social disorder of market integration should per se
challenge the liberal peace panacea, given the many concrete violent manifestations of neoliberal-
ism covered in this paper. At a different level, I have also tried to meet IR scholarship in its own
terrain, understanding how some of these forms of neoliberal violence may seem inconsequential
for theorists who focus on interstate war (within certain periods of time) as the only/main concern
in the ﬁeld of international relations. Here, I have relied on Polanyian understandings of a ‘counter
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movement’ to chart the links between processes of liberal market integration and the social and
political repercussions that follow, including in our times an apparent rise in illiberal politics.
To do so, I have relied on a temporal critique to identify the long-term political impacts of the
social dislocation prompted by the pursuit of a market utopia. I have also explained the multiplicity
of scales in which violence works through world market capitalism, arriving at a contemporary
situation in which people across the world look for answers in defensive and aggressive forms
of nationalism that cohabit in curious and conﬂicting ways with the continued prevalence of
the world market order.
In many ways, these conclusions are not entirely surprising. Activists and critical scholars of the
global political economy, geographers, anthropologists and sociologists have for decades studied
the destructive effects of liberal market integration, from the impacts on job destruction following
the implementation of free-trade agreements to the increased commodiﬁcation and destruction of
nature or the rising insecurity that we experience as market principles come to govern our everyday
lives – all these having been politically conditioned and supported by institutions that ensure the
reproduction of a system which continues to transfer risk from markets to individuals despite
important forms of resistance (Cammack, 2004). Yet, these insights have not been easily incor-
porated into IR debates on conﬂict and indeed have been deliberately ignored by proponents of
a liberal or capitalist peace, who insist on associating market integration with both democracy
and a decreased likelihood of conﬂict, despite ample evidence for the contrary. This problematic
position can be summarized in two false dichotomies that continue to pervade the argument for a
liberal or capitalist peace: one between market liberalism and authoritarianism, which should have
been completely refuted by Pinochet’s Chile, Lee Kuan Yew’s Singapore, the rise of the Chinese
economy or ‘disciplinary neoliberalism’ in the West (Gill, 1995), and another between economic
globalization and nationalism, clearly under challenge today by recent political developments in
places such as the UK, the United States or China, to name a few.
Although I should reiterate that it is not the goal of the paper to predict the likelihood of con-
ﬂict, some broad conclusions can be reached from my critique of liberal peace. If the consolidation
of the world market along competitive economic lines and models of Pareto-efﬁciency has resulted
in various forms of violence upon many (environmental, political, economic) and a rise of belliger-
ent discourses, one should expect that replacing the goals of efﬁciency (or at least prevailing under-
standings of efﬁciency) and proﬁtability with those of social justice could deliver different
outcomes (Sandbrook, 2011). Here we could imagine processes of integration that put the rights
of people and nature before those of capital – for example, with trade and investment agreements
that penalize environmentally destructive methods of production, impose severe tariffs on pro-
ducts manufactured in jurisdictions where labour is unfree and where inequality is reﬂected in abu-
sive salaries, or that prohibit the use of tax havens. These objectives will not be easily achieved,
given the consolidation of the world market and its competitive pressures and, indeed, the
great material interests at play.
To reach any of these goals, internationalist allegiances between progressive forces across
nation-states would be necessary, both to push for the retreat of the market frontier from the
many aspects of social life that it has inundated in the last decades and to combat the tendency
to seek defence in national identities that hamper the sort of transnational political mobilization
needed to take on eminently global challenges (Gonzalez-Vicente & Carroll, 2017; Sandbrook,
2011). Importantly, such campaigns are not a distant utopia, but have been a powerful opposi-
tional force since the early days of the neoliberal era, with their voices gaining renewed prominence
in the West following the 2007/08 Global Financial Crisis. Ultimately, the future of global peace
will depend on societies’ ability to come together and shape a world order where the rights of
people and nature prevail over those of capital and, indeed, over the dystopia of a disembedded
and dehumanized world market.
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NOTES
1. The endorsement here of a ‘dialectical’ approach is inspired by dialectical materialism, but refers mostly to
something quite simple: the need to study social developments as part of complex realities where layered, simul-
taneous and interrelated processes shape each other across time and space (Marx, 1990; Castree, 1996). For the
purposes of this paper, this implies studying peace and conﬂict, or liberal and illiberal politics, not as individual
phenomena with a life of their own and self-contained internal mechanisms, but as processes that can only be prop-
erly understood when contextualized in relation and in tension with each other.
2. A concern among some liberal authors has been whether powerful domestic businesses in different settings
would attempt to curb globalizing trends and protect national monopolies. However, while the domestic rearticula-
tion of capital, with the rise of its globally competitive fractions and demise of the rest, may have been swiftly assimi-
lated in various contexts without signiﬁcant turmoil, it is not the threatened domestic monopolies that challenge
today the foreign policy preferences of diverse states, but the increasingly alienated populations – from the exploited
to the forgotten and the unemployed to the precariat – who seek refuge in leaders and discourses that offer – with
more or less ingenuity – responses to the great disembedding of markets and society.
3. A closely aligned set of literature on the issue of ‘democratic peace’ demonstrates also themalleability of deﬁnitions,
often tainted byUS-friendly readings of history. For example, an article byMichaelMousseau based on theMilitarized
Interstate Dispute data set omits every US intervention in Latin America from 1816 to 1992 (except for a dispute with
Ecuador in 1980), allowing the author to conclude that ‘joint highly democratic dyads are about 3 times more likely …
to resolve their militarized conﬂicts with mutual concessions’ (Mousseau, 1998, p. 210; see also Bremer, 1993).
4. Obviously, many on the left, but outside themainstream occupied by traditional centre-left parties, have been wary
of the increased inequalities, precarization and insecurities that accompany, for example, the marketization of welfare
provision or the deployment of anti-inﬂationary regimes. Yet, while some of these voices have lately gained prominence
in various contexts (e.g., Syriza inGreece, JeremyCorbyn in the UK or Bernie Sanders’ contest for the leadership of the
Democratic Party the United States), the implementation of progressive agendas is an uphill battle within the con-
straints of wider regional politics and global market competition, even after taking hold of national governments.
5. Here it is important to note the transformation of the centre-left following a process of depoliticization in the
1990s, with parties such as Labour under Tony Blair, the Socialist Party in Spain or the Democrats under Bill Clin-
ton supporting a liberal business-centric global order, and marketization and ﬁnancialization at home. This resulted
in vast sections of the working class being delinked from the political institutions that represented them during
much of the post-war period, and rapidly declining party and union membership.
6. Critical scholars and ‘alter-globalisation’movements alike do not necessarily advocate autarkic politics. Instead,
they often oppose the state as an anchor of neoliberal globalization and seek to carve out spaces for social contesta-
tion and democratic accountability in the global liberal order that resemble in some way the arrangements that some
societies developed historically in their relations with national governments and capital (McMichael, 2006).
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